On 13th January 2026, the Court of Appeal (“COA”) found that Federal Territories Minister YB Hannah Yeoh (“HY”) had successfully established defamation against former Inspector General of Police Tan Sri Musa Hassan (“TSM”). The appellate bench, comprising Datuk Azimah Binti Omar, Dato’ Dr Choo Kah Sing & Datuk Dr Shahnaz Binti Sulaiman, unanimously reversed the High Court (“HC”)’s decision to dismiss HY’s suit back in December 2024.
We explore the salient points by the COA on a wide array of areas in defamation law below. The full written grounds of the COA can be found here.
The Impugned Speech
At the heart of the appeal is TSM’s speech at a forum in UiTM in January 2020 as follows:
“Dan mereka ingin juga merosakkan agama Islam dalam negara ini kerana mereka mempunyai kaitan dengan Evangelist group. Mereka juga mempunyai kaitan dengan Yahudi untuk merosakkan negara ini. Dan banyak research yang telah saya buat, dimana saya dapati bahawa ada hubungan antara Evangelist group dengan Parti DAP di sini, ya, kerana mereka telah menulis buku, Hannah Yeoh juga telah menulis buku untuk menjadikan negara ini negara Kristian.
Ada juga orang Melayu mengatakan, “Apa salah negara ini menjadi negara Kristian?” Astaghfirullahalazim. Sampai ada orang Melayu yang sanggup keluarkan perkataan itu. “Apa salahnya negara ini menjadi negara Kristian?” Memang kita dah banyak buat silap terutama politicians. Kita sendiri yang buat silap. Kita bagi muka banyak sangat dekat dia orang. Kemudian kita, sekarang ini UEC pun nak diiktirafkannya. Tetapi politicians ni, dia fikir diri dia sendiri, itu masalah dia. Dia bukan fikir fasal negara, bukan fikir fasal tuan-tuan, tidak. Dia fikir fasal, apa keuntungan dia dapat kepada diri dia. Ini masalah dia.
Tetapi akhirnya, kita yang mendapat kesusahan kerana kita punya anak cucu tak tentu lagi negara ini menjadi negara mereka. Kita akan dijajah semula di mana kita tidak boleh menerima ini. Jadi kita perlu berjaga-jaga dan perlu bersuara.”
A. The Derbyshire Principle
The COA re-emphasised that the Derbyshire principle does not bar public officers from commencing defamation suits, and that principle only limits public bodies from filing for defamation. The Federal Court in Lim Guan Eng v Ruslan Kassim and another appeal [2021] 2 MLJ 514 had in fact already clarified this aspect of the Derbyshire principle.
The HC was hence wrong to dismiss Hannah Yeoh’s defamation suit on this point, and further erred when it justified its finding by relying on the overruled Court of Appeal decision of Syed Nadri Syed Harun v Lim Guan Eng & Other Appeals [2018] MLJU 2101.
The HC further erred in attempting to distinguish Lim Guan Eng on the basis that YB Lim Guan Eng had commenced defamation in his personal capacity (and not as Chief Minister of Penang), but the COA found that such distinction was a “non-starter in the context of the Derbyshire principle” and the Federal Court in Lim Guan Eng had highlighted the “problematic exercise of demarcating between the two capacities”.
B. Whether The Impugned Speech Was Defamatory
On the issue of whether an impugned speech is defamatory, the COA reminded that the law only requires the plaintiff to prove the tendency on whether it would injure a person’s reputation, and there is no need to consider whether it actually affected the plaintiff’s reputation in reality. The HC hence erred in finding that TSM’s speech was not defamatory because of the alleged low level of social media virality & engagement on the videos featuring the speech.
The COA also criticized the HC’s finding that TSM’s speech did not defame HY as she nonetheless won with a bigger majority for her constituency in the General Elections. The COA pointed out that “[just] because because a victim of slander can survive the slander or libel to cease and fight another day, does NOT exonerate the herald of falsity from his tortious wrong. It is akin to exonerating a tortfeasor who scratched and damaged the exterior of a car on the pretext that the damaged and scratched car can still be driven.”
The COA eventually found that TSM’s speech was defamatory in that it would expose HY to contempt, ridicule, and hatred especially by the Malay Muslim majority in Malaysia as follows:
“a. The Plaintiff intends to destroy Islam in Malaysia (merosakkan agama Islam dalam negara ini);
b. The Plaintiff has ties with the Jews to destroy Malaysia (mempunyai kaitan dengan Yahudi);
c. The Plaintiff had written her book to convert Malaysia into a Christian nation (menulis buku untuk menjadikan negara ini negara Kristian); and that
d. The Plaintiff intends to menjajah Malaysia (Kita akan dijajah semula).”
C. Whether the Impugned Speech Referred To HY
The COA held that this element can be established even if the said speech does not expressly name the plaintiff, as one can infer that the plaintiff belongs to a class of persons mentioned in the said speech. Hence, when TSM used the phrase “mereka” several times in close proximity to “Hannah Yeoh” in his speech, it can be inferred that “mereka” also refers to HY. The HC undertook a simplistic analysis that since TSM did not use HY’s name but merely adopted the phrase “mereka”, TSM’s speech did not refer to HY.
D. Whether There Was Publication of the Impugned Speech
The COA was critical of the HC’s approach in finding there was no publication merely because there were no negative comments on social media pages airing TSM’s speech, reminding that “the law does not make a distinction between a widely spread publication or a ‘modestly’ spread publication of slander. It intrigues us that the LJC was not able to identify that the mere fact of a “spread” of the impugned statements (albeit modest) is still a spread (publication) of the impugned statements.” Ultimately, the COA held that it was obvious there was publication as TSM’s speech was delivered in an auditorium attended by many in UiTM & the video was aired on social media.
E. Defence Of Justification
On the defence of justification, the COA rejected the evidence of Dr Kamarul Zaman Yusof (“KZY”) (TSM’s witness) whose academic opinion supposedly justified the impugned speech. This was because only expert witnesses can give opinion evidence, and since KZY was never adduced as an expert witness & a witness of fact, KZY can only testify on “factual matters that [he] had observed with his senses” – the COA reminded that a plain witness “has no business to ‘enlighten’ the Court of his or her opinions”.
Furthermore, the COA very crucially held that it is insufficient for a defendant to say he was reliant upon another person’s statement or opinion to satisfy the threshold of truth (which forms the cornerstone of the justification defence). Such other person’s statement or opinion is “at best…hearsay” and merely proves that “the ‘other’ person had perpetuated the defamatory statement”. The COA aptly held: “Succinctly, to prove a defence of justification, the defendant cannot simply plead that he ‘relied’ on the rumor or ‘belief’ told to him by another. This manner of pleading would only limit the Defendant’s case to proving that a rumor was told onto him and not the core truth of that rumor. This would be a far cry from satisfying the threshold to prove justification.” On the facts, TSM hence cannot rely on the justification defence by merely saying he relied on KZY’s opinion on HY’s book.
The COA also rejected TSM’s argument that excerpts of HY’s book justified the impugned speech. The specific paragraph of the book relied by TSM reads:
“And that’s precisely my second reason for writing this book. To glorify the Lord. May I glorify Him with this testimony and as you read my journey, I pray you see His hand at work. He is waiting to do the same in your life. Only obey. With God, all things are possible”.
The COA found that, at best, such excerpt can be taken as HY propogating the religion of Christianity (a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 11 of the Federal Constitution), and had not insinuated that HY intended the book to be used as a tool to specifically propagate to Muslims with the intention to destroy Islam and to convert Malaysia into a Christian nation. The COA further held that if such short paragraph can be taken as propagation to Muslims, “then by the same logic, the full length and heft of the bible should not be allowed to be on the shelves at all and all printers and publishers of the bible can be inferred as an attempt to ‘destroy Islam’ and turning Malaysia into a Christian nation (which is certainly preposterous).”
At the end of its analysis on justification, the COA gave a salutary reminder to elected leaders in the context of increasingly polarizing racial & religious sentiments in Malaysia:
“As an aside, we believe that elected leaders of any race or religion, ought to dispense their duties as the people’s guardians vide exemplary leadership and governance. The LJC’s and the Defendant’s logic in this case would insist that any non-Muslim politician with a modicum of influence, can be seen as a ‘threat’ to Islam merely because that non-Muslim politician’s personal religious journey would inadvertently ‘affect’ or inspire Muslim electorates or citizens to ‘abandon’ his or her Muslim faith. Such egregiously flawed logic would dissuade good governance from elected leaders, and our great nation is already in dire need of genuinely good leaders and exemplary governance. On the same score, it is equally an opportunity for Muslim leaders to inspire awe and reverence to the Islamic religion via his or her own exemplary leadership which in turn can beget more cohesion in the iman and taqwa of the Malaysian Jemaah or even plant new seeds of iman and taqwa which could broaden the numbers of the Malaysian Jemaah. Succinctly, the personal religious journey of any Malaysian leader or politician should not be so easily perceived as a threat to Islam, and the majority Muslims in Malaysia.”
F. Defence Of Fair Comment
The COA found that, due to the unique & specific rules of pleading fair comment in Order 78 Rule 2(3) of the Rules of Court 2012, a defendant in the pleadings must very clearly distinguish between which part of the impugned speech he believes as fact, and which he had expressed as a matter of opinion/comment – failure to do would be fatal to the defence.
The COA explained the rationale as follows: “This is understandably so simply for the fact that if in case a Defendant had not appropriately particularized and distinguished his words between facts and opinions, then neither the parties properly prepare their cases nor the Court can make the appropriate determination as the Defendant had not even clearly particularized those words he stated to be the truth, and those words he stated as a reactionary comment/opinion.”
On the facts, since TSM had failed to pleaded the above demarcation between facts and opinion/comment, the COA rejected the defence of fair comment entirely.
G. Defence Of Qualified Privilege
The COA clarified that, for a defendant to rely on the defence of qualified privilege, there was a need to apply the Reynold’s 10 points responsible journalism test. This was since the Federal Court in Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd [2021] 5 MLJ 79 had found that the defence of qualified privilege & Reynold’s privilege are one and the same. That being said, the COA emphasized that the Reynold’s responsible journalism test is not mandatory, but still serves as a useful gauge to examine the true nature and intent of an impugned statement.
On the facts, the COA found that, although TSM had a moral & social duty as a former IGP to speak up on matters, there was no responsible journalism or investigation before uttering the speech – TSM had not tendered his supposed research on HY’s book & there was no evidence of genuine attempt to verify the truth.
The COA also found it fitting to express that the law does not immunize top public officers in Malaysia to speak about any issue carte blance without due care to the truth:
“That being said, the Defendant’s position as the former IGP does not and by all means should not present the Defendant with a carte blanche to say or publish anything and everything without any due care, responsibility, and accountability as to the truth or legitimacy of matters that the Defendant had published to third parties. We believe that it is thoroughly undesirable and in fact and unbefitting for the law to allow people of such power and influence to simply and carelessly perpetuate untruths without any due care of the legitimacy of matters he or she is disseminating to third parties or the public at large.”
H. Damages
The COA ultimately awarded a global sum of RM250,000 in damages to HY. The COA considered that HY had enjoyed political success despite TSM’s speech, the fact that the impugned statement was a small portion of the entire length of TSM’s speech & that TSM was largely influenced by KZY’s opinion.
HY was represented by Razlan Hadri Zulkifli, Ambiga Sreenevasan, Sangeet Kaur Deo, Lim Wei Jiet, Lee Guo Wen, Nevyn Vinosh Venudran & Harshaan Zamani. TSM was represented by Mohd Khairul Azam bin Abdul Aziz & Nur Jehan bt Abu Bakar.
